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Abstract
Does Reformational philosophy have an answer to the many guises 
of pluralism?
Both the transformation o f society and the inner reformation o f the 
sciences require and are dependent upon global views o f reality, 
society, man, nature and truth and implicitly harbour views o f order. 
Moreover, Reformational philosophy as a transcendentalist project 
argues that all theoretical positions implicitly or explicitly harbour 
such global views. Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, rooted in the ‘meta­
narrative ’ o f Christianity provides significant distinctions which make 
it possible to contextualize many o f the issues raised in post-moder­
nism. It is this type o f global view that arouses the suspicion ofpost­
modernists who have a strong suspicion about meta-narratives o f any 
kind and especially notions o f totality and universality.
In this paper it is argued that Reformational philosophy’s emphasis 
on the diversity and coherence o f the creational order and the 
diversity transcending fullness o f meaning given in Jesus Christ 
provide significant barriers to counteract the phenomenon o f 'wild 
pluralism ’ so characteristic o f post-modernism’s emphasis on 
pluralism in cultures and scientific theorizing.
This article is a revised version of a response to a paper by Sander Griffioen read at 
the Fifth International Symposium of the Association for Calvinist Philosophy, 22- 
26 August 1994, Hoeven, the Netherlands.
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1. Pluralism and communication in Reformational 
philosophy
Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique o f theoretical thought has a missio­
nary and apologetic dimension which aims at making discussion between 
opposing philosophical schools o f thought possible, convincing the 
discussing partners that all philosophical positions are bound to supra- 
theoretical presuppositions which are intrinsically religious in nature. This 
attempt to advance discussion and communication amidst a plurality of 
positions is one ideal which Dooyeweerd’s philosophy shares with many 
thinkers who emphasize the need for a ‘conversation o f mankind’, 
dialogue, communication and the cultivation o f community life. 
Dooyeweerd’s proposed method and ultimate aims to achieve communi­
cation differ quite radically from the majority o f projects proposed by 
post-modernist thinkers. His proposal to recognize the law order for 
reality as common denominator and basis for discussion would be rejected 
as essentialist in intent by most post-modern thinkers. On the other hand, 
Dooyeweerd, like post-modernist reasoning, has a fundamental 
appreciation o f diversity and differentiation, perspectives, plurality, if  you 
will. Yet, this emphasis too, differs quite fundamentally from post­
modernist emphases on pluralism. The question posed by these superficial 
resemblances and fundamental differences is whether Dooyeweerd’s 
transcendental critique can actually provide a bridge for communication 
between competing schools o f thought and whether the understanding of 
plurality intrinsic to his notion o f the coherence o f diversity o f reality, can 
overcome the relativistic effects so prevalent in what Bernstein (1987) 
calls “wild pluralism”. It is with Reformational philosophy’s possible 
response to the latter problem that I intend to deal in this paper.
1 would like to argue that two central notions o f Dooyeweerd’s social 
philosophy provide significant points o f departure to counteract the 
relativism and fragmentation so characteristic o f post-modernism with its 
emphasis on pluralism. Recognition o f  the creational law order which 
conditions the world we live in, sets limits to the relativistic consequences 
o f ‘wild pluralism’. The diversity transcending notion o f the fullness of 
meaning and the coherence o f diversity on the other hand relativizes the 
absolute claims o f pluralism. Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique pro­
vides us with a crucial Biblically conditioned insight that all possible 
diversity, albeit o f  reality, culture or scientific theories, are relativized by 
their relationship to the central point o f reference o f all o f  reality, human
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existence, human society and human knowledge -  the fullness o f meaning, 
Jesus Christ who has reconciled all things to God.
What characterizes Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is its practically all encom­
passing scope. Departing from an epistemological problem he developed 
the contours o f an extensive anthropology, philosophy of society, eccle- 
siology and ontology -  a philosophical ‘grand narrative’ based on the 
assumption that in its attempt to identify the ontic structures conditioning
our knowledge o f reality, it would inter alia provide the basis for2
communication between competing philosophical schools. From his point 
o f view both the transformation o f society and the inner reformation o f the 
sciences require and are dependent upon global views o f reality, society, 
man and nature and truth -  transcendental ground ideas. Moreover, Re­
formational philosophy as transcendentalist project, argues that all theore­
tical positions implicitly or explicitly harbour such global views. 
Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique o f society and theories o f society are 
not unproblematic. In Dooyeweerd’s philosophy at least four possible 
notions o f totality are found of which the transcendental idea o f the 
meaning totality provides a diversity transcending point o f reference (cf. 
Dooyeweerd, 1957:424-425). Yet, this notion harbours a certain 
ambiguity. The idea o f the fullness o f meaning, often translated as the 
totality o f meaning, most probably ought to have been translated as the 
fullness, unity or the concentration o f meaning. ‘Totality’ in the fourth 
sense o f the term, appears open to at least the following renderings when 
read in conjunction with the definition o f the task o f philosophical 
sociology :
* Philosophical sociology provides a view o f totality, i.e. a perspective 
on the whole o f all societal relationships (in this sense there would
The problems related to the so-called ‘pretence’ of the transcendental critique is 
not argued here. Suffice it, at this stage, to refer only to the well-known discussion 
in Reformational circles pertaining to the problems raised by the so-called 
‘pretence’ of the transcendental criticism proposed by Dooyeweerd (Van Riessen, 
1970; Dooyeweerd, 1941).
Theodore Plantinga has strong reservations concerning the applicability of terms 
such as view and/or perspective to the Christian approach (cf. Plantinga, 1991).
The ambiguity of Dooyeweerd’s conception of the ‘social’ and the various possible 
interpretations of his formulation of the field of study of Sociology as a discipline 
ought also to be taken into account here (cf. Botha, 1971).
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be an indication that Dooyeweerd seems to work with a notion of 
society as a temporal whole) (cf. Botha, 1971).
* Alternatively, philosophical sociology requires an Archimedean 
point which transcends the diversity o f societal structures and in this 
sense the philosopher needs to find a standpoint within the totality of 
meaning in order to facilitate a ‘correct’ view o f all societal 
institutions and their relationships. Such a position would prevent 
any form of totalitarianism or reductionism Dooyeweerd’s 
philosophy argues, but o f course constitutes some form of 
preconditionalism (Wolterstorff, 1984).
For the purposes o f this paper these problematic aspects o f his view of 
totality will not be dealt with. Suffice to say that sympathetically read, it 
is an attempt at philosophically formulating a pregnant Biblical insight 
that the coherent diversity o f all reality is found in Christ the fullness of 
meaning. The question is, what consequences does this recognition have 
for post-modern views of pluralism.
2. Pluralism the ‘meta-narrative’ of post-modernism
Trying to come to terms with the factual state o f affairs o f “varieties of 
pluralism” (Bernstein, 1987) and the post-modernist emphasis on plura­
lism, one is knee deep in a whole plethora o f possible and impossible forms 
o f pluralism dealt with in related literature on this subject. Apart from 
multiculturalism and cultural pluralism one finds metaphysical pluralism, 
ontological pluralism, methodological pluralism, epistemological 
pluralism, theoretical pluralism, metaphorical pluralism, systematic 
pluralism and a host o f other sorts and types o f pluralism. The question 
arises whether the sophisticated and refined definitions and distinctions of 
structural and confessional pluralism that have been developed (Mouw & 
Griffioen, 1993; McCarthy et al., 1981) in Reformational philosophy are 
adequate and sufficient to deal with fundamental problems o f unity and 
diversity, constancy, change and solidarity and the spiritual antithesis 
which lie at the root o f most o f these forms o f pluralism. Dooyeweerd’s 
philosophy, rooted in the ‘meta-narrative’ o f Christianity provides 
significant distinctions which make it possible to contextualize many o f the 
issues, but the fundamental presupposition o f his philosophy is a global 
view o f reality and the recognition o f  a total view o f society and a ‘total’ 
theoretical view underlying the scientific investigation o f society. It is 
exactly this type o f total view or global view that arouses the suspicion of
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post-modernists (Bernstein, 1987). Christian philosophers need not 
necessarily share this suspicion, but do need to give some account o f the 
reasons why they do or do not feel comfortable with such a rejection of 
meta-narratives and global or universal views. Perhaps it is exactly the 
fact that post-modernism has developed its own meta-narrative: “There are 
no meta-narratives...!” which makes an uncritical acceptance o f the post­
modern stance untenable. This has been very succinctly argued by W.J.T. 
Mitchell who claims that pluralists are “closet dogmatists” who, especially 
in American intellectual life, have regarded the repression o f dogmatism as 
a general acceptable strategy. Mitchell (1986:497) says:
Pluralism is a curious hybrid of dogmatic and ideological elements. In 
Pepper’s version it is a dogmatic antidogmatism, a philosophy which pretends 
that it has no dogmas itself and which refuses to tolerate any other philosophy 
that admits to having a dogmatic basis, that is, a foundation in beliefs that 
exceed proper ‘cognitive grounds’. Pluralism’s first problem, then, is not that 
it has a dogmatic basis, but that it refuses to recognize that basis.
This basis Mitchell calls the ideological character o f this refusal. Once 
this dogmatic trait in pluralism’s emphasis on tolerance and relativism has 
been recognized, we need to have a closer look at the type o f relativism 
which seems inevitably to accompany post-modern versions o f pluralism.
3. The potential anarchy of ‘wild pluralism’ and extreme 
relativism6
The phenomenon of pluralism and historicism (in the guise o f relativism) is 
part and parcel o f a broader trend which in many ways is characteristic of 
our daily lives (Bernstein, 1987:511). The consciousness o f historical 
change is not only characteristic o f contemporary culture -  but also o f our 
scientific and theoretical reflection about culture -  to such and extent that 
Toulmin (1971) claims that the developments within philosophy o f science 
are a litmus test for the basic changes taking place in wider culture. 
Bernstein (1987:516, 517) speaks o f the almost chaotic babble of
5 I am indebted to Craig Bartholomew for this idea.
6 Bernstein (1987:522) introduces this term and points to the fact that Kuhn, 
Wittgenstein and Derrida are often cited as being in support o f some wild 
pluralism. He disagrees with such a statement and argues that what emerges from 
Kuhn’s, Wittgenstein’s and Derrida’s reflections on paradigms, language and 
translation is much closer to what he has characterized as being quintessential to 
the pragmatic understanding of pluralism.
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competing voices so characteristic o f the range o f cultural experience. At 
the same time there seems to be a significant preoccupation with 
community, solidarity and communication, especially at a local level. 
What makes these developments more acute is the fact that the pluralities 
have ‘gone wild’. Bernstein (1987:522) argues that it has infected almost 
every aspect o f human endeavour. He says: “This is a pluralism in which 
we are so enclosed in our own frameworks and our own points o f view that 
we seem to be losing the civility, desire and even the ability to 
communicate and share with others.”
Bernstein (1987:522) says we seem to be living through a time when there 
is “ ... a wild fluctuation between anxiety and celebration o f radical 
differences”. What is distinctive about the mood o f our time, he (Bernstein 
1987:522) says, “ ... is the odd and unstable mixture o f a sense o f fragmen­
tation and o f an interlocking system that develops according to its own 
logic and over which we do not seem to have any control”. Central to 
these developments is the decentring o f the Cartesian conception o f the 
subject. To some extent Reformational philosophy has been as critical of 
the fundamental notions o f modernism as post-modernism is today. But its 
critique o f wild pluralism will be based not only on its modernist 
moorings, but more specifically on the lack o f recognition o f God’s stable 
and reliable order for His creation. The critical question is what type of 
‘pluralism’ this diverse-but-coherent order represents and whether it 
actually provides the diverse forms o f pluralism represented in the 
literature with any real point o f contact.
4. Pluralism in a plurality of guises
Bernstein (1987:524) draws attention to the fact that Kuhn (incommen­
surability o f paradigms), Wittgenstein (language games and forms o f life) 
and Derrida (inescapable plurality o f languages) are frequently cited to 
support some version o f ‘wild pluralism’. He opposes such interpretations 
and argues that all these forms o f pluralism are much closer to what he has 
characterized as the ‘pragmatic understanding o f pluralism’ in the tradition 
o f Dewey who was committed to the democratic way of life in which 
communication, dialogue or critical encounter was always a real possibi­
lity which required “ ... passionate practical commitment to be realized” 
(Bernstein, 1987:511). Watson (1990:355) does not regard Dewey as a 
pluralist since “ ... his account o f philosophies o f knowledge makes all but 
his own only partial ...” . If he were to be a pluralist, Watson argues,
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Dewey would have to recognize that it is not he alone who provides an 
account o f the whole, whilst others only have parts, but that both Dewey 
and those who differ from his philosophy give an account o f the whole but 
differ in the aspect o f it which is taken as primary. “Different philosophies 
would then be seen to be the result o f  the selection o f differing starting 
points or principles by the mind” (Watson, 1990:356). This type o f plura­
lism Watson calls archic pluralism, i.e. a pluralism which has its source in 
first principles. Watson (1990:356) also distinguishes three other grand 
types o f pluralism on the basis o f their sources: perspectival pluralism  
that results from differences in the context and the perspective o f the 
knower; pluralism o f  hypotheses that results from different hypotheses 
about reality; methodological pluralism  that results from different formu­
lations o f a truth that transcends them all. Watson applies these diverse 
approaches to the interpretation o f texts o f various kinds. The obvious 
point o f entry to the problem o f pluralism in general in Reformational 
philosophy is the recognition o f the modal diversity which not only 
represents the diversity o f ways in which reality exists, but also the 
possible horizons o f experience o f reality and scientific access to reality. 
As such these modal structures condition the existence o f reality and 
human experience and knowledge o f reality and can accommodate all four 
grand types o f pluralism distinguished by Watson. Yet, Watson’s typo­
logy departs from a basic assumption that in no way does the recognition 
o f plurality give legitimacy to the unwarranted privileging o f one’s own 
position. Both he and James E. Ford (1990:337) would call such a 
position “dogmatism”. Perhaps this is exactly the point where Refor­
mational philosophy provides a different emphasis. Despite Dooyeweerd’s 
protestations to the contrary he develops his account o f the Christian 
philosophical framework as a true philosophical rendering o f the Biblical 
groundmotive of creation, fall and redemption in Jesus Christ -  one able to 
situate or explain the derailments o f most others.
One o f the fundamental insights o f the Reformational tradition has been 
the emphasis on the development o f a Biblically based Christian world 
view and a Christian philosophical framework which would provide the 
unifying perspective within which to situate a diversity o f theories. There 
is no doubt about the necessity o f such a project, but the academic climate 
o f post-modernism is most certainly not conducive to the imposition of 
such a total view within the setting o f the modem academy. This state of 
affairs is exacerbated when students are drawn from multicultural and 
multiconfessional backgrounds. The Christian university is the nodal point
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where these crucial issues meet. If one argues that an adequate under­
standing o f structural pluralism is a prerequisite for the positioning o f the 
Christian university in society then an adequate understanding o f the 
implications o f confessional pluralism and perspectivalism is a prerequisite 
for its internal academic calling to Christian scholarship.
There is another facet o f pluralism, which is intriguing, when dealt with 
against the valuable distinction between structure and direction so basic to 
Reformational philosophy. This fact pertains to the intricate blend of 
structural and confessional pluralism present in the issue o f the plurality of 
theories with which most scientific disciplines deal within the post-modern 
university. Even though a university may find its niche within society with 
the maintenance o f all the norms pertaining to structural pluralism and 
even if its confessional status is recognized and acknowledged by all and 
sundry and formulated in a mission statement, vision statement and 
academic creed, the Achilles heel o f the Christian university is its attitude 
towards and critical accommodation o f theoretical pluralism in its teaching 
and research. Both multiculturalism and theoretical pluralism raise ques­
tions concerning the ‘larger picture’ or total view within which such a 
plurality can be situated and evaluated. This is an issue that requires 
closer attention. In both cases the relationship o f the universal to the 
particular is at stake. Here we shall primarily deal with theory pluralism.
5. Theory pluralism
Post-modernist theory pluralism with its view that there are universally 
valid, but culturally local sciences, raises the question whether it is 
possible to identify some common denominator in terms o f which issues 
like incommensurability, relativism, complementarity and contradiction of 
theories could be judged and evaluated. In post-modernism scepticism has 
replaced the search for the elusive universal common denominator, a 
search which has been given up in both instances, because essentialism 
and foundationalism have been found wanting and unable to provide the 
required universal support for modernity’s notion o f truth. Basic to this 
state o f affairs is post-modernism’s privileging o f the shattering o f the 
subject with its concomitant inevitable splintering o f identity; a process to 
which Feminism and Post-Colonialism also contributed a thorough 
scepticism about a ‘se lf that is personal and homogeneous. In this regard 
John Forrester (1994) says that to think one can recover the holistic 
understanding o f self is an anachronism. And yet, it is exactly such a
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plurality transcending self which is at the ‘heart’ and the core of 
Dooyeweerd’s Reformational philosophy, both in its transcendental 
critique o f theoretical thought and its discussion o f foundational issues in 
his theory o f societal institutions. Furthermore, this plurality transcending 
‘se lf is the focal point o f God’s central religious law which conditions the 
diversity o f subjects bound by the law.
Theoretical pluralism can be understood in various senses: It can be 
understood as complementarity o f theories, as for example in Bohr’s view 
o f the complementarity o f wave and particle theories o f light. On the other 
hand, a plurality o f theories can also be mutually exclusive or even 
contradictory. In both cases a more encompassing picture with an implicit 
understanding (acceptance or rejection) o f order is presupposed -  an 
understanding that provides the basic contours functioning as criteria for 
determining complementarity or contradiction. In the Reformational tradi­
tion the notion o f the creational order has been a central point o f departure 
-  both for the understanding o f the diversity o f societal structures and their 
interrelationships -  and also for the understanding o f the process of 
theoretical concept formation present within the diversity o f scientific 
disciplines. It is exactly such a notion o f universality and stable order that 
is being contested by recent developments in philosophy of science.
6. Changing order7 or changing concepts and stable 
order8 ?
Recent developments in philosophy of science have put a strong emphasis 
on the social or conventional construction o f reality as common 
denominator between theories and positions. Such a pluralism o f worlds is 
seen as a socially constructed phenomenon and the diversity of 
perspectives or world views which it represents are seen to be reconciled 
or transcended through social processes such as the conversation of 
mankind, solidarity and communication. This theme cannot be developed 
extensively in this article. What is o f interest here is the central role o f the 
social construction o f reality as it manifests itself in the construction of 
scientific concepts.
7 From the title o f H.M. Collins’ book (1985).
8 From the title o f Hesse’s review of Collins’ book (1985).
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In scientific theorizing it is the preoccupation with scientific change and 
the obvious instability o f scientific concepts that has brought about 
renewed interest in the relationship o f stability and order on the one hand 
and changing perceptions and concepts on the other (cf. Collins, 1985; 
Nersessian, 1984; Nersessian, 1989). Central to this relationship is the 
solution o f the problem o f induction and the understanding o f order 
defended by a school or tradition. In each one o f the recent ‘turns’ (Botha, 
1994) in philosophy of science, the quest for order and the perennial 
search for the elusive ‘universal’ takes on a different shape, yet in all cases 
this quest is superimposed on the subject-object divide o f the Cartesian 
legacy (Bernstein, 1983:115).
Reflection on the role o f language and language formation in science crops 
up in most philosophical schools o f thought involved in giving an account 
o f the nature and structure of science. This has been the case in the central 
role o f formalized and axiomatized language in logical positivism, but also 
in most philosophical trends that have followed Wittgenstein in some or 
other way. Central to most o f these projects is the concern for a satis­
factory account o f how changing languages and displaced concepts can 
give account o f the order perceived in and experienced by all in the same 
common reality. It is the phenomenon o f scientific change amidst the 
uniformities so characteristic o f the world, which continue to intrigue 
philosophers, philosophers o f science and o f language. During the course 
o f the sixties the preoccupation with language so characteristic o f the 
linguistic turn has a concomitant ‘turn’ to the history o f consecutive 
language games, forms o f life and/or scientific paradigms, the so-called 
historicistic turn (cf. Kisiel, 1974; Shapere, 1966) represented by Hanson, 
Toulmin, Polanyi, Kuhn, Feyerabend et al. The well-known discussion 
between Kuhn and Boyd (1980) about the ‘joints o f nature’ exemplifies the 
way in which especially Kuhn resolved the basic problem concerning the 
underlying stability and order which makes science possible. Kuhn is not 
willing to concede the ontological claim entailed by Boyd’s position that 
scientific theories approximate one real world by the accommodation of 
language to the existing natural kinds in the world (Boyd, 1980:407). On 
the contrary. Kuhn (1980:418,419) says:
The view towards which I grope would also be Kantian but without ‘things in
themselves’ and with categories of the mind which could change with time as
9 Cf. the title of Rorty’s book (1967).
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the accommodation of language and experience proceeded. A view of that 
sort need n o t,... make the world less real.
The historicist emphasis leads to a recognition o f and sociological empha­
sis on the role o f the scientific community as initiator and sanctor o f the 
legitimacy o f scientific knowledge and language -  the sociological turn 
(Brown, 1984:3-40) with its variations o f inter alia conventionalism and 
constructivism. The historical and sociological ‘turns’ could be subsumed 
under the well-known typology of Suppes’ (1974:125-27) Weltanschau- 
ungsanalyses.
The Strong Programme o f  Sociology o f  Knowledge o f  the Edinburgh 
School on the other hand, argues that sociology does not only always step 
in when there is a deviance from the norm of rationality, but that social 
causes are always present and are determining factors in the production of 
knowledge. The sociologists refuse to presuppose that scientific beliefs, if 
compared to beliefs within other human communities or ‘tribes’, have any 
special relation to reason, truth or reality. This position which argues that 
‘epistemic factors are actually social factors’, exemplified by Bloor, is 
qualified as “extreme extemalism” by Niiniluoto (1991:139).
Harry Collins’ (1985) constructivism or so-called Empirical Programme 
o f  Relativism could be regarded as an extreme example o f this position. 
Collins (1985:148) claims: “It is not the regularity o f the world that 
imposes itself on our senses but the regularity o f our institutionalized 
beliefs that imposes itself on the world ... The locus of order is society.”
He argues that the natural world has a small or nonexistent role in the 
construction o f scientific knowledge, but concludes that because o f the fact 
that there are groups, societies and cultures, therefore there must be large 
scale uniformities o f perception and meaning (Collins, 1985:5). He wants 
to develop his EPR as a sociological solution to the problem of induction 
(Collins, 1985:6).
Collins’ position is a Wittgensteinian one in which he anchors rules in 
language games and language games in social forms o f life and ultimately 
concludes that habitual perceptions are wholly a matter o f convention. 
Collins’ thesis is that scientific consensus is in principle indistinguishable 
from any other sort o f persuasion o f people to believe in a political, 
ideological or religious system, or even to believe for purposes o f their 
own class or personal or professional advancement. It is interesting that 
Mary Hesse (1986) who certainly does not have too much sympathy with
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the realist position (she often calls herself a ‘moderate realist’, when 
accused o f being ‘anti-realist’), counteracts this position o f Collins with an 
appeal to the regularities o f the psycho-social natural world. Hesse 
(1986:723) says: “There is a perfectly good explanation o f why science 
exhibits order, namely that it reflects something o f the order o f the natural 
world.”
In her exposition o f the family resemblances and the way in which the 
recognition and learning o f these resemblances takes place she appeals to 
notions such as “the same experience...”, “shared assumptions”, “the same 
physiology”, “the same cultural expectations”, “irreducible perceptions” 
that are a function o f “our physiology and its commerce with the world” 
(Hesse, 1985/6:39).
Elsewhere (1988:113) she talks about the “ ... objective order in the 
psycho-social-natural world in which we all live (which) is more various 
and multifaceted than our culture recognizes -  more various, but not 
infinitely various so that any old classification will do for any given social 
purposes” .
In spite o f her recognition o f these “objective realities” to which language 
is related she opts for a ‘moderate’ realist position. Her motivation is 
clearly the fact that our knowledge o f these objective realities is limited, 
seldom definitive and always open to correction. By and large this is an 
assumption usually shared by anti-realist thinkers, yet it would be possible 
to subscribe to this same fact and still be sympathetic to a realist position. 
McMullin (1984:35) e.g., maintains such a position. She settles for a 
weaker form o f realism (some would argue, for anti-realism) when she 
says that meanings o f predicates in scientific language grow in dynamic 
interaction with culture and experience; terms do not correspond to 
universals, Hesse claims. She contends that the threat posed by various 
forms o f relativism following the work o f Kuhn and Feyerabend, has led to 
the undermining o f the belief in the reality o f laws o f nature and their 
corresponding universals. She (Hesse, 1984:6) says:
Radical revolutions of theoretical language call into question the possibility of 
reaching or even converging upon the ideal theory-language with its ‘correct’ 
classification of universals and hence laws, and if there is no convergence, 
may this not be because there are no ideal natural types?
Elsewhere she does acknowledge the fact that the social habits acquired by 
scientists do reflect the order in the world. She (Hesse, 1988) argues for a 
socialized epistemology with a reconciliation o f various philosophical
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positions, but is not willing to agree with Collins that all inductive 
regularities are purely conventional.
Dooyeweerd’s emphasis on the idea o f law order, fundamental to both 
ontological and theoretical diversity, provides a significant avenue to 
understand the problems posed by the ‘turns’ in the philosophy of science, 
with their relativistic consequences referred to above. His recognition of 
the conditioning and structuring character o f God’s law for creation and 
the modal diversity o f reality provides fertile avenues o f access to 
understand why the consecutive discovery o f new factors operative in 
theorizing is possible and tempts schools o f thought to localize the law or 
order in some aspect o f reality itself albeit the logical, the historical or the 
social. Succumbing to this temptation inevitably leads to misguided and 
distorted views o f plurality because it confuses perspectives with reified 
notions o f plurality and negates the Reformational philosophical notion of 
the fullness o f meaning and the coherence o f diversity which relativizes 
any hypostasized notion o f plurality. It is exactly this process o f hyposta- 
tisation, which is both the cause and the result o f wild pluralism -  hypo- 
statisation that can be counteracted through the recognition o f the rela­
tionship o f all forms o f diversity to a plurality transcending point of 
reference.
This state o f post-modern culture confronts us with the intriguing problem 
of cultural pluralism and the challenges it poses to the Christian university. 
Griffioen (1994) formulates this challenge succinctly:
The challenge a Christian university faces ... is to serve as a public forum in 
a multicultural society. Being at the crossroads of structural pluralities (as 
university) and directional diversity (as a Christian institution) it can be 
expected to be sensitive to all the pluralities at stake.
In the following section some aspects o f this challenge will briefly be 
discussed.
7. The Christian university and multiculturalism
Multiculturalism obviously is a multifaceted phenomenon. In a far 
stronger sense than in most other societal phenomena one discerns the 
entanglement o f elements o f structural and confessional pluralism in this 
phenomenon. There are strong elements o f what has traditionally been 
called ethnicity or cultures in the social anthropological sense o f the word 
(Young, 1976, ch. 2). Here one thinks o f the ethnic areas and suburbs in
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many North American metropolitan areas. There are also strong elements 
related to lifestyle and morals, such as the Californian gay lifestyle. In 
post-modernism the term is often used to designate the right o f groups to 
their own understanding and interpretation o f life and values and the 
equality and relativity o f these lifestyles and values. When the pheno­
menon is dealt with in a political context it calls forth the issue o f rights of 
groups coupled with the concomitant notion o f universal human rights. I 
agree with Griffioen (1994) that human rights ought to be seen primarily 
as a juridical or legal notion, especially when it crops up within the 
modem political system. There is another dimension which ought to be 
recognized in this respect. It is the kernel o f truth at the core o f both 
universalism and particularism. It could be illustrated by the dilemma 
posed by the development o f (Western) universities in Third World 
cultural contexts.
The introduction o f the notion o f a university into a less developed culture 
(I recognize the value laden nature o f this statement) inevitably leads to a 
destruction o f the indigenous culture and a replacement with typically 
Western standards and values. An opponent o f such a position could ar­
gue from the perspective o f multiculturalism that such an imposition is not 
morally justified. The critical question African universities, however, have 
to deal with is how to reconcile the diverse value systems within a 
multicultural setting with the traditional and age-old universal values 
epitomized by the university. Perhaps the situation o f a Christian univer­
sity within a multicultural society in transition, as is the case in South 
Africa, could be the best possible case study in this respect. A university 
per definition embodies universal values and the search for some sort of 
‘universal truth’. But local, cultural, regional and national issues force 
this universal ideal to come to terms with the local and the particular. 
Questions such as the following need to be dealt with:
* How does one adapt the typical Western concept o f the university to 
the needs o f developing countries and people?
* Is there a cultural form or guise in which the university can come 
closest to fulfilling its specific cultural and educational task?
* Is it possible to meet the needs o f Third World peoples without 
inevitably denaturing the structure o f the university?
These are all important issues and ones that require close attention o f the 
international Christian scholarly community. Moreover, they are issues 
with which South African Christians cannot deal alone. As relevant and
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crucial as the critical input was from Christian scholars during the 
apartheid era, as crucial and decisive will be the contribution o f Christian 
scholars who help think through how the complex issues at stake here, can 
be redemptively resolved. Interestingly enough, exactly the modernistic 
and universalistic notion o f rationality which has always provided a 
steadfast anchor for discussions o f this kind, has thoroughly been eroded 
and discredited. Moreover, the experience o f many South African univer­
sities has been that the type o f academic knowledge provided within the 
setting o f the university has proved to be far removed from the typically 
contextual needs and requirements o f developing cultures.
8. Plurality and diversity within the context of a global 
and total view
Both theoretical pluralism and multiculturalism raise the question whether 
there is some universal common denominator which transcends or unifies 
the plurality or diversity o f theoretical perspectives on science or cultures 
present within a society. Dooyeweerd’s Christian philosophy departed 
from this basic question concerning a common denominator o f and for 
reality. In this process he came to the conclusion that a Scripturally 
informed answer to three basic questions is a prerequisite for the develop­
ment o f a Christian view o f society and a responsible theoretical account 
o f the unity and coherence in diversity o f societal structures. (The three 
basic questions, according to Dooyeweerd, concern the issues o f origin, 
unity, coherence and diversity o f societal structures.) Fundamental to the 
so-called sociological ground idea is Dooyeweerd’s (1957:169) view that 
all societal structures o f individuality find their radical unity and totality of 
meaning “ ... beyond cosmic time in the central religious community of 
mankind”.'0
1 shall not deal with the discrepancies which are apparent when one 
formally compares the triad o f transcendental ideas in Dooyeweerd’s 
development o f the modal and the sociological groundidea respectively, 
except to point to the fact that the central religious community o f mankind 
functions both as a transcendental apriori for the existence o f the diversity
10 The ambivalent ways in which Dooyeweerd formulates the relationship between 
the heart and central religious community of mankind has been dealt with 
extensively by Botha (1971) and Strauss (1972).
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o f structures and is also a condition for a correct theoretical understanding 
o f societal sphere sovereignty.
A crucial issue in this respect is the question whether recognition o f and 
obedience to structural principles for societal structures can be accom­
plished without the fundamental religious commitment to Christ. The 
formulation o f the principle o f structural pluralism often creates the 
impression that it is possible to recognize such structural plurality as a 
neutral or common (?) state o f affairs, without it being accompanied by a 
communal commitment to the basic tenets o f the Christian faith. 
Commitment to the Christian faith is a prerequisite as the Christian faith is 
recognized as being able to make both the understanding o f the 
relationships between structures possible and to provide protection against 
the temptations o f relativism and universalism. Given, Dooyeweerd’s for­
mulation o f the relationship between Jesus Christ’s redemptive work in 
creation and recreation makes it possible to argue that even those who are 
not ‘in Christ’, but are obedient to the structural norms for a given 
situation, can share in the blessings o f what has traditionally been called 
‘common grace’. I, however, do think those who argue that one cannot 
divorce the obedience to structures and societal norms from the 
fundamental ultimate commitment to the giver o f these norms, the 
Sovereign God, have a very strong point. It is exactly at this point where 
the tension between a common denominator and the directional antithesis 
surfaces -  a tension that cannot be easily resolved.
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